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We present a model of vertical product differentiation and exit where a domestic and a 
foreign firm face fixed setup costs and quality-dependent costs of production and compete in 
quality and price in the domestic market. Quality-dependent costs are quadratic in qualities, 
but independent of the quantities produced. The domestic government may impose a 
minimum quality standard binding for both foreign and domestic firms. In the presence of an 
initial cost advantage of the domestic firm, a sufficiently high minimum quality standard set 
by the domestic government will enable the domestic firm to induce exit of the foreign firm, 
i.e. to engage in predation. However, the same standard would lead to predation by the 
foreign firm, if the foreign firm had the initial cost advantage! 
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1. Introduction 
Quality standards and regulations
1 on safety, reliability, labeling, public health or environmental 
grounds are the cause of many recent policy disputes and allegations of unwarranted technical trade 
barriers.
2  This is also exemplified by t he European Union’s ongoing efforts to implement new 
directives on harmonization of standards
3 and related disagreements between the European Union 
and the United States.
4 Consequently, support for minimum standards concerning product quality, 
safety, or e nvironmental protection, varies considerably.
  In most cases, the EU favors mutual 
recognition of national standards, where governments set standards for their own industries and 
recognize the adequacy of each others’ standards.
5 While the EU only allows national treatment in 
exceptional cases, national treatment is the approach favored by WTO.
6 
                                                                 
1 According to Sykes (1995), “standards” are voluntarily agreed on by industry while “regulation” is imposed by 
governments. However, following most of the literature, we use both terms interchangeably for government-
imposed quality standards. 
2 See, e.g., OECD (1999). 
3Some of these are food and drug laws, harmonization of technical standards, environmental protection standards,  
consumer protection, product liability,  reciprocal recognition of university degrees, general vocational training 
policies, and harmonization of regulation of services such as insurance or telecommunication; e.g. DIHT  (1988) 
identified all these areas as contributing to the potentially costly segmentation of the European regional market. 
4 Disputes over standards between the EU and the US over standards arise quite frequently, such as recently in 
the case of Microsoft or over genetically modified food. 
5Full harmonization of national standards, the main goal until the late 1970s, is now constrained to essential safety 
and health requirements.  In all other cases, mutual recognition of national standards should be applied.  This 
approach was substantially furthered by a series of past decisions of the European Court.  It has also been 
embraced in the European Commission’s (1985) White Paper.  In addition, the Single European Act provided a 
caveat to mutual recognition in Article 100A(4), which allows single governments to apply national treatment “... 
on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 36 ...”  These major needs include, among others, public morality 
and the protection of commercial property. 
6 See, e.g., WTO (1995). Baliamoune/Lutz: Predation & Standards    3 
Many of the markets, products and firms affected by minimum quality standards could be 
characterized as oligopolistic, where individual firms do have strategic power. This gives rise to 
questions about the effects of standard setting procedures on the behavior of participating firms in 
such oligopolistic markets, since standards may substantially change the options available to 
partipating firms.
7  
Therefore, this paper presents a case where a minimum quality standard facilitates predation, i.e. the 
domestic firm is enabled to force exit of the foreign firm. For this case, We use a game-theoretic 
model
8 of vertical product differentiation that has been extensively applied in the literature. One 
domestic and one foreign firm face quality-dependent product development costs and constant 
marginal production costs. They compete in quality and price in a single domestic market. Demand is 
such that an uncovered market results for all possible outcomes. Since increased differentiation in 
terms of quality decreases competition between rival products, higher quality products will coexist 
with lower quality products, even if both firms were identical. However, in the presence of 
technological differences, it is possible that high-quality products will be provided by the national 
industry with high costs.
9 This results in inefficient production, since costs are increasing and convex 
in quality. 
                                                                 
7 For example, Garella (2006) shows that even 'innocuous' minimum quality standards, namely below the lowest 
quality level in a market, may have effects on equilibrium outcomes. 
Seminal and further work on the economic theory of regulation includes Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), Posner 
(1971, 1974), Becker (1983), Laffont and Tirole (1991) on capture theory, Abdelhamid (2003),  Mokhtari and 
Abdelhamid (2008) on international regulatory rivalry. 
8 Phlips (1996) argues that game theory can contribute both to the detection and to the economic defense of 
predatory behavior and presents a few important European anti-trust cases to illustrate this. 
9 Many industries are characterized by ongoing introduction of new products in varying qualities. This particular 
case depicted here may be the result of a foreign incumbent with a first-mover advantage using an older inefficient 
technology while the domestic firm enters the same market later with a more cost-efficient technology. See also, 
e.g., Siebert (2003). Baliamoune/Lutz: Predation & Standards    4 
The basic features of the model utilized here have been well-known for some time. Gabszewicz and 
Thisse (1979) developed a framework for quality preferences where consumers with identical tastes 
but different income levels demand different quality levels. They analyzed the Cournot-duopoly 
equilibrium and showed its dependence on the income distribution and quality parameters. Shaked 
and Sutton (1982) showed that in the case of duopolists that first choose quality and then compete in 
price, the equilibrium will include both firms entering with distinct quality levels enjoying positive 
profits, i.e., they demonstrated how quality differences relax price competition. Ronnen (1991) uses 
Shaked and Sutton’s framework to demonstrate cases where quality standards improve welfare. He 
concludes that there exists a binding minimum quality standard such that all consumers are weakly 
better off, both firms have positive profits, and total welfare is increased. Our model is based on the 
framework of Shaked/Sutton and Ronnen.
10 As in Ronnen, the effects of quality standards on 
industry competition are primarily driven by their influence on price competition and the qualities 
produced. Due to the duopoly situation and the nature of price and quality competition, an 
unregulated equilibrium results in qualities being too low, prices being too high and quality 
differentiation being too low when compared to a welfare-maximizing solution. When qualities 
produced become more similar, price competition intensifies. In response to a quality standard that is 
binding for the low-quality producer, qualities rise, quality differentiation is reduced, and prices 
adjusted for quality fall. High quality rises also because qualities are strategic complements due to the 
effect of quality differentiation on price competition. Reduced quality differentiation results because 
increasing quality is increasingly costly. With a high standard, profits of both firms are reduced or one 
                                                                 
10 See also Lutz (2000), Lutz, et.al. (2000), and Lutz/Baliamoune-Lutz (2003).  Related research on the effects of 
minimum quality standards has been forwarded, e.g., by Das/Donnenfeld (1989), Boom (1995), Crampes/Hollander 
(1995) Ecchia/Lambertini (1997), Constatatos/Perrakis (1998), Scarpa (1998), Valletti (2000), Jinji/Toshimitsu (2004), 
Hansen/Nielsen (2006). Further work on trade policy and quality choice includes Hallak (2006), Toshimitsu/Jinji 
(2008). Baliamoune/Lutz: Predation & Standards    5 
firm is forced out of the market.
11 Consequently Lambertini/Scarpa (2006) show that with a standard 
an additional equilibrium may exist where predatory behavior occurs and as a result of predation only 
one firm remains. 
In this paper, we also show conditions under which only this second equilibrium remains and special 
cases where the identity of the surviving firm is determined. In the case presented, a more efficient 
domestic firm and a less efficient foreign firm operate in a single domestic market. The foreign firm 
initially produces and sells a product of higher quality. This initial situation could be the outcome of 
the foreign firm being longer in the market than the domestic firm, so that the foreign firm operated as 
a Stackelberg-leader towards the domestic firm in the past. Since the domestic firm could make 
monopoly profits if it was alone in the market, there is an incentive for the domestic government to 
facilitate this outcome by some policy. In the absence of a facilitating policy (or a prohibitive entry 
cost), however, the domestic firm cannot credibly prevent entry or effect exit of the foreign firm, 
since the current outcome represents a Nash-equilibrium. We show that the domestic government 
can choose a standard such that the domestic firm: (1) cannot have positive profits as the low-quality 
firm; and (2) can set a (higher) quality such that the foreign firm cannot have nonnegative profits as 
either the low-quality or the high-quality firm
12; and (3) domestic welfare is increased. Hence, the 
standard enables the domestic firm to force exit of  its foreign competitor.
13 
                                                                 
11 Related research on entry/exit has been forwarded, e.g., by Hung/Schmitt (1988), Donnenfeld/Weber (1995, 
1992), Lutz (1997), and Siebert (2003). 
12 Since the foreign firm cannot enter with positive profits, the issue of contestability, such as in Baumol/Willig 
(1986), does not arise in the context of this model. 
13 This could also be interpreted as a quality reversal induced by the standard. Quality reversals in a vertical 
product differentiation framework have been previously addressed by Herguera/Kujal/Petrakis (1995, 2002), 
Motta/Thisse/Cabrales (1997), and Herguera/Lutz (1996, 1998, 2002). Baliamoune/Lutz: Predation & Standards    6 
While the outcome is ultimately the consequence of the government policy, namely the set standard, it 
is the domestic firm that induces the exit of its foreign rival by its choice of quality and price. This can 
be seen most clearly in the case where the standard is set such that the domestic firm would make 
exactly zero-profit if it offered low quality at the standard-level. In the analysis presented here, the 
domestic firm would nevertheless choose a higher quality level and effectively drive its foreign 
competitor out of the market, i.e. the domestic firm would choose to engage in predation even though 
there is a viable duopoly alternative. 
 
2. The Model 
There are two firms, the domestic firm d and the foreign firm f, both competing in the domestic 
market. If both firms remain in the market, then they produce distinct goods, sold at prices pd and pf, 
respectively. The two products carry a single quality attribute denoted by sd and sf, respectively. 
Either firm faces production costs that are increasing, convex (quadratic) functions of quality, the 
exact level of which depending on quality chosen and a quality cost parameter b. Total costs of firm i 
are then: 
  ci = bi si2  (1) 
In the domestic market, there is a continuum of consumers distributed uniformly over the interval [0, 
T] with unit density. Each consumer purchases at most one unit of either firm d's product or firm f's 
product. The higher a consumer's income parameter t, the higher is her (his) reservation price. 
Consumer t's utility is given by equation (2) if good i is purchased.
14 Consumers who do not 
purchase receive zero utility. 
                                                                 
14 Consumers who do not purchase receive zero utility. Baliamoune/Lutz: Predation & Standards    7 
  ut = si t - pi  (2) 
Firms d and f play a two-stage game
15. In the first stage, firms determine qualities to be produced 




To solve the game, consider first the demand faced by the high-quality and low-quality firm, 
respectively. Let h and o stand for high and low quality, respectively. These demands are then given 
by:
17 
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Let i = h, o; let j „ i. The profit function for firm i is given by Pi = piqi(pi,pj,si,sj) - ci(si). Taken both 
qualities as given, the price reaction functions in each market are given as the solutions to the first 
order conditions. Solving the resulting equations for both prices, equilibrium prices are then given as: 
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15In this formulation, firm i not entering the market is equivalent to  firm i choosing si = 0.  The entry decision by 
firms is made simultaneously when choosing quality. 
16To derive solutions, we will use the concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium, computing the solutions for each 
stage in reverse order.  Both firms choose their respective product quality from the same interval [0, ¥).  The 
resulting market equilibria will include some consumers in the lower segment of the interval [0, T] not valuing 
quality enough to buy any product.  This guarantees an interior solution of the price game. 
17Let th = (ph - po)/(sh - so) and to = po/so.  Consumers with t = po/so will be indifferent between buying the low-
quality product and not buying at all.  Consumers with t = (ph - po)/(sh - so) will be indifferent between buying 
either the high-quality or the low-quality product.  Consumers with T ‡ t > th will buy high quality, consumers 
with th > t > to will buy low quality, and consumers with t < po/so will  not buy at all. Baliamoune/Lutz: Predation & Standards    8 
Note that for all sh > so, T > th > to > 0 will hold, i.e., equation (4) is in fact an unconstrained price 
equilibrium. 
Given the price equilibrium depicted above, demands and thus profits can be expressed in terms of 
qualities. For positive qualities si (i = h, o), these profit functions are: 
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Similarly, consumer surplus
18 can be expressed in the following way: 
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Quality Competition 
To derive the firms' quality best responses, we investigate each firm's profit function, given the other 
firm's quality choice, and taking into account the behavior in the price-setting subgame. Given the 
order of qualities, the profit functions in equations (5) are concave in the respective firm´s own 
quality. The profit-maximizing choices form a Nash-equilibrium in qualities, where both  marginal 
profit functions evaluate to zero. The first order conditions for the high and low quality firm, 
respectively, are then given as: 
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18Consumer surplus is defined as {￿(t*sh - ph)dt +  ￿(t*so - po)dt} where the first integral goes from th to T and the 
second goes from to to th. Baliamoune/Lutz: Predation & Standards    9 
From the properties of the revenue functions and the slopes of the quality best responses depicted in 
the Appendix, it is easy to see that the two qualities are strategic complements. Furthermore, a 
forced increase of the low quality will reduce product differentiation and increase price competition.  
The resulting equilibrium qualities for identical firms (i.e. bh = bo = b) are then:
19 
sh = 0.126655 T2 / b and so = 0.0241192 T2 / b 
However, for our example, we assume the low-quality producing home firm to have a cost 
advantage such that bh = 1.5 bo = 1.5 b.
20 Hence, the resulting equilibrium is
21 
  sh = 0.08533 T2 / b and so = 0.02133 T2 / b  (8) 
Due to the foreign high-quality firm’s cost disadvantage, its quality is now substantially lower than in 
the symmetric case. Therefore, the home firm’s quality is lower, too. However, since the home firm 
has a cost advantage, quality differentiation is lower. 
The resulting domestic Welfare and Profit are: 
  Wd = 0.00978 T4 / b and Po = 0.00068 T4 / b  (9) 
To keep the following example simple, we assume that both firms have to incur costs of providing 
quality per period, i.e. the quality chosen in the period before does not matter. 
 
                                                                 
19The exact procedure to find the analytical solution is decribed in the Appendix.  Note that t2/b enters in a 
multiplicative way and therefore does not affect the calculations. 
20Of course, the parameter choice for the cost advantage is arbitrary.  However, the qualitative result prevails as 
long as an initial unregulated equilibrium exists where the low-cost firm offers low quality. 
21It is easy to check that the domestic firm has no incentive to provide high quality given the foreign firm’s quality 
in equation (7).  This is done by calculating the domestic firm’s profits as high-quality firm given that low quality 
is equal to the foreign firm’s quality in (7) and maximizing with respect to quality. Baliamoune/Lutz: Predation & Standards    10 
3. A Quality Standard Facilitating Predation 
In this section, we will develop a case where the domestic government can increase welfare as well 
as domestic profits by an appropriately chosen standard which will induce the domestic firm to 
choose a quality higher than its initial quality and the formerly chosen foreign quality while the foreign 
firm is induced to exit the market. Hence, this is a case of policy-induced predation. 
The domestic government chooses a standard such that the following conditions are satisfied: 
1) The domestic firm cannot make positive profits as the low-quality firm. 
2) The domestic firm can choose a quality such that the foreign firm cannot have positive profits as 
either the low-quality firm or the high-quality firm. 
3) Domestic welfare and profits are increased. 
Condition 1) requires a standard greater than or equal to the quality level at which the domestic low-
cost firm makes zero profits given that the foreign high-cost firm provides high quality at its quality 
best response. This requires that the standard s m be set such that s m  ‡ 0.04275 T 2/b. (All 
calculations are shown in the Appendix.) 
Given such a standard, entry by the foreign firm is effectively blockaded. This means that the 
domestic firm can set its uncontested monopoly choice sd = 0.125 T2/b at which Condition 2) is 
satisfied. This is verified by calculating the foreign firm’s best response profits as the low-cost firm 
and the high-cost firm, respectively, setting the other quality equal to 0.125 T2/b. Both calculations 
yield negative results. 
Condition 3) is also satisfied as can be seen by calculating domestic welfare and profits given sd = 
0.125 T2/b and sf = 0. The result is summarized below. 
  sm = 0.04275 T2/b, sd = 0.125 T2/b, Wd = 0.03125 T4/b and Pd = 0.015625 T4/b  (10) Baliamoune/Lutz: Predation & Standards    11 
Since welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and profits, we can see immediately that domestic 
consumer surplus rises.
22 Since the foreign firm cannot make profits, the foreign country as a whole is 
worse off.
23 This means that the policy includes international profit-shifting and can therefore be 
qualified as strategic trade policy. 
The initial market situation as well as the effect of such a standard is illustrated in Figure 1. With 
home quality on the vertical and foreign quality on the horizontal axis, the line segment (abcd) isd the 
home firm’s best response function in quality and the line segment (fghj) is the foreign firm’s best 
response function in quality. There are two possible Nash equilibria E 1 and E 2; according to our 
assumptions, initially E 2 was chosen with the home firm offering low quality.





foreign show the loci where the home firm and the foreign firm, respectively, make 
zero profits as the low-quality provider. The standard sm is chosen such as under condition 1) and as 
a result both duopoly equilibria E 1 and E 2 are no longer feasible; instead the home firm can now 
choose quality sd and the new equilibrium is predation at P1 where foreign quality is 0, i.e. the foreign 
firm drops out of the market.
25 
 
                                                                 
22However, although quality sold rises, not all consumers win since market coverage is reduced. 
23 Note that by assumption there is only a domestic market, so the welfare result for the foreign country follows 
immediately. 
24 Both quality best responses have a discontinuity at points b-c and g-h, respectively, where the best response 
jumps down from offering high quality to offering low quality. 
25 In this case, there also exists an alternative equilibrium at point f with the foreign firm choosing monopoly 
quality and the domestic firm staying out of the market. However, this second equilibrium is risk-dominated 
(Harsanyi/Selten, 1988) by the depicted new predation equilibrium at P1 since the domestic firm has a cost 
advantage. Baliamoune/Lutz: Predation & Standards    12 
4. Foreign Domination Instead of Domestic Predation 
If the domestic firm has a cost advantage, a quality standard that is set “too low”, i.e. too close to the 
low-quality level without regulation, may lead to a situation where the foreign firm can only survive as 
the high-quality supplier in the market. Given enough time and without a persistence of quality 
leadership, this could lead to a quality reversal where the domestic industry is not driven out of the 
market, but ends up as the low-quality supplier despite of its cost advantage. 
Let the home cost advantage be again such that bo = 1.5 bh = 1.5 b. A minimum quality standard 
greater than or equal to 0.0349322 T2/b, but not much greater than that, will remove the foreign 
firm’s ability to make profits as a low-quality supplier.
26 Consequently, only one Nash-equilibrium 
remains once the one-shot market game is played again. This will be the one with the foreign firm 
providing high quality despite, or here because, of its cost disadvantage. 
Of course, this would not be a policy objective for the standard-setting domestic government but 
instead a danger to be avoided. This case hence illustrates how an ill-designed policy may worsen the 
situation of the home industry that was meant to be protected. 
 
5. When the Standard Invites Foreign Predation 
If the foreign firm has the cost advantage rather than the domestic firm, then the domestic standard 
would lead to predation by the foreign firm and exit of the domestic firm. This follows immediately by 
analogy from the arguments presented in the previous section.
27 Note, though, that domestic welfare 
                                                                 
26 The critical value for the standard is calculated by simultaneously solving the first-order condition for the high-
quality firm with bh=b and the zero-profit condition for the low-quality firm with bo=1.5 b for sh and so. 
27 It can also be illustrated in Figure 1 if the labeling for the home and foreign qualities were switched, i.e. if the 
foreign quality were depicted at the vertical axis. Baliamoune/Lutz: Predation & Standards    13 
would still rise since the increase in consumer surplus would be higher than losing the domestic firm’s 
low-quality profits. 
To illustrate this, assume for simplicity (and without much loss of generality) that the foreign firm has 
an advantage such that bh = 1.5 bo = 1.5 b. Note that again, the domestic firm provides low quality. 
Now the same minimum quality standards enables the foreign firm to set monopoly quality while the 
domestic firm’s best response is to exit. The resulting situation is summarized as: 
  sm = 0.04275 T2/b, sf = 0.125 T2/b, Wd = CSd = 0.015625 T4/b and Pd = sd = 0  (11) 




The purpose of the case shown above is to illustrate that domestic policies such as standards might 
have strategic trade effects that are not marginal but entail a complete restructuring of the international 
market in question.
28 In the case presented, a standard that was nonbinding for the foreign firm 
ultimately lead to the exit of the foreign firm. This standard also enabled the domestic firm to act 
exactly like a monopolist without the threat of further entry. In doing this, the domestic firm chose a 
quality that was not bound by the standard, higher than the quality it would have chosen without a 
standard, and higher than the quality the foreign firm would have chosen without the standard. 
However, we do not generally argue for the application of such policies, even if they lead to welfare 
increases for the domestic country. On the contrary, policy makers should simply be aware of the 
possibility of rather radical and detrimental effects of domestic policies. The possibility of predation Baliamoune/Lutz: Predation & Standards    14 
arises generally when a policy leads to negative profits for some subset of an industry’s best response 
choices. In addition, the final effects of such a policy and the resulting predation are rather sensitive to 
the exact standard chosen as well as to the magnitude and direction of cost differences between 
competing industries.  
 
Appendix 
(All calculations are available upon request.) 
Properties of the Revenue Functions 
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Slopes of Firms' Quality Best Responses 
The slopes of the high and low quality firms' quality best responses can be calculated (using the 
implicit function theorem) as dsi/dsj = -(¶(¶Pi/¶si)/¶sj)/(¶(¶Pi/¶si)/¶si), where i is either high or low 
quality and j is the other quality. Both slopes are positive, but less than one. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
28 Additional complexities arise, when the firm’s compete not only in the domestic market, as assumed throughout 
this paper, but also in the foreign market. See, e.g., Lutz/Baliamoune-Lutz (2003). This topic, however, is left for 
future research. Baliamoune/Lutz: Predation & Standards    15 
Properties of the Consumer Surplus Functions 
Let CSI (We = D, F) denote region We's consumer surplus function. Firms' qualities are denoted by 















































Calculation Procedure for the Quality Equilibria in Section 2 











For a=1 ( i.e. bh = bo = b) r = 5.25123 while for a=2/3 ( i.e. bh = 1.5 bo = 1.5 b) r = 4.0. Using r 
to express sh in terms of so and substituting for sh in the first equation of (7) allows for calculating the 
equilibrium qualities for any given value of T and b. (However, the ratio of cost parameters a must be 
fixed.) 
 
Calculations for the Case of Section 3 
Calculation of a standard such that the domestic firm makes zero-profits as low-quality provider. The 
standard would bind the domestic firm. Take equations (5a) and (5b) with (bh = 1.5 b, bo = b). 
Solve simultaneously: 
  {¶Ph/¶sh = 0 and Pio = 0} to obtain {sh = 0.091728 T2/b, so = 0.0427526 T2/b} 
In this solution, so represents the binding standard on the domestic firm. Baliamoune/Lutz: Predation & Standards    16 
Calculation of the uncontested monopoly choice of the domestic firm. Take equation (5a) with (bh = 
b, so = 0). Solve: 
    ¶Ph/¶sh = 0 to obtain sh = 0.125 T2/b 
Here, sh is the uncontested monopoly choice of the domestic firm. 
Given the domestic firm’s quality choice in equation (A.5b), the calculations below show that the 
foreign firm cannot make positive profits. 
Take equation (5a) with (bh = 1.5 b). Solve simultaneously: 
  {¶Ph/¶sh = 0 and Pih = 0} to obtain {sh = 0.0972222 T2/b, so = 0.0555556 T2/b} 
In this solution, so represents the minimum domestic quality such that the foreign firm cannot make 
positive profits as the high-quality provider. This quality is less than the chosen domestic quality of 
0.125 T2/b. 
Take equation (5b) with (bo = 1.5 b, sh = 0.125 T2/b). Solve: 
    Po = 0 to obtain so = 0.034746 T2/b 
This solution represents the maximum foreign quality such that the foreign firm can make nonnegative 
profits as the low-quality provider. It is less than the standard of 0.0427526 T2/b. 
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